The moral economy of looting could be virtuous. Even in the 21st century. If in the 19th century nobody doubted that saving art and cultural objects from the uncivilized (everyone not part of the west) by the end of the 20th century this has become a rejected norm, and wide ranging restitution has and is taking place, international norms established, and legal and voluntary return captures headlines in the major media periodically.
Yet, all this seem to be gone by the wayside with the flaunting of these norms by the well publicized auction at Christie of Yves Saint Laurent’s collection of art which netted over 300 million euros and received global attention. Mostly for an intriguing tension between law and morality. The objects included two bronze animal heads, a rabbit and a rat -- fountainheads from the 18th which were looted during the 19th-century Opium Wars (1860) from a Qing Dynasty palace in Beijing. They were sold for 31m euros.
The Seller Pierre Berge decided to sell the collection following YSL’s death, and to donate most of the money including to AIDS. Personal profit was not the driving force.
The Chinese vehemently contested the sale of the looted art, which according to international norms, if not law seemingly ought to be illegal. The increased attention and frowning of dealing with looted art, especially since the 1990s, would have placed the Chinese if not in a strong legal position, at least morally virtuous: contesting colonial spoils, fighting the legacy of 19th century western imperialism.
However, Pierre Berge inserted a whole new component into the moral economy of the auction, when he stated that he would give the objects back to China for free if Chinese officials would: "declare they are going to apply human rights, give the Tibetans back their freedom and agree to accept the Dalai Lama on their territory."
This seemingly reversed the moral equation. The looter (the possessor of the loot, at least) demands human rights justice, the abuser of human rights is the victim of the plunder who demands justice.
A good straight forward legal description by Patty Gerstenblith,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/arts/design/17auct.html?ref=design
shows that it is not a case where the legal stakes are aligned with the moral intuition.
But what is the moral framework?
The supporters of the Chinese position argue the looted objects are unrelated to the human rights, and it makes no sense to tie the two together.
The rationale of Berge seems to be: there is no legal claim to the objects, only moral. If so, how can you present a moral claim with bloody hands?
It seems to me that the combination of power and morality play an interesting if underappreciated role in this case. If the legal frame was clearer, that is if looted objects were subject to restitution regardless of when these were looted, or if French law determined that such loot had to be returned, the moral position would have been ignored.
If the auction proceeds were seen as serving greediness, the legal situation might have been the same, but the public perception would have been pro Chinese.
While those are disparate issues, neither related legally, nor politically, they are joined in the moral economy of evaluating global violence and crimes. Somehow, to judge impressionistically from the media, there was no mocking of the sale as immoral, the Chinese partisans cried load, but were quoted not supported in the western media. This in contrast to the highly moralistic tone employ with museums from the Getty to the Metropolitan, or the British Museum when dealing with looted art.
Will the Chinese get the objects restituted? Possibly. But it would be for political considerations, not moral.
